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Centrality and Peripherality Upside Down? Gender 
Equality and the Family in Western Europe 
Riitta Jallinoja∗ 
Abstract: The study tries to apply Rokkan's centre/ 
periphery dichotomy to the analysis of gender equality and 
the family, which, according to Rokkan, belong to the 
domain of culture. The final criterion for centrality and 
peripherality is provided by the level of modernization, 
gender equality being as such a sign of modernization, 
while the frequency of new family forms being the criterion 
for the degree of modernization in the case of the family. 
According to the indicators used in the study, we can 
conclude that politico-economic centrality and peripherality 
do not coincide with centrality and peripherality in the 
domains of gender equality and the family, the differences 
in this respect stemming rather from each country's cultural 
heritage. Amont the politico-economically peripheral 
countries, the four Nordic countries form the most 
modernized territory as to gender equality and the family, 
whereas the southern seaward periphery form the least 
modernized territory in this respect. Centrality in the 
domain of economics provides a more or less intermediate 
position as to the modernization of gender equality and the 
family. 
Introduction 
The idea for this study in which I try out the centre/ periphery dichotomy to the 
analysis of gender equality and the family came to me from Stein Rokkan and 
his collaborator, who in Economy, Territory, Identity (1983) use the territorial 
approach to examine differences in collective identity formation (Rokkan &
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Urwin 1983, 1). Although the issues of gender equality and family have also 
had strong political undertones, they have lacked the powerful territorial aspect 
that is present in Rokkan's centre/periphery idea. Nevertheless his charac-
terization of the dichotomy is inspiring enough to experiment it an these two 
topics. 
Relating gender equality and the family to Rokkan's framework, we may 
suggest, first, that both of these belong to the domain of culture, which consists 
of transfers of messages, norms, life styles, ideologies, myths and ritual 
systems (Rokkan & Urwin 1983, 2-4). On this basis it may be assumed that 
centrality and peripherality will in some way appear in gender equality and the 
family, too, the direction of the flow of codes providing the most important 
criterion for determining how to order nations an this dimension (see Rokkan & 
Urwin 1983, 14-15). Although the general idea is clear, it is difficult to 
establish exactly how the codes of gender equality and the family flow from 
one country to another; at least no detailed Information is readily available an 
this. There are, however, some instances which provide convincing evidence of 
the direction of the flow, perhaps most notably the women's movement. On the 
basis of a number of documents we know that the women's movement, 
particularly during its most active years, has advanced from one country to the 
next very much an the strength of an information flow consisting of personal 
contacts and written material (Jallinoja 1983). The early years when national 
women's organizations were set up, thus serve as rough indicators of the 
advancement of the movement and provide approximate criteria for centrality 
and peripherality in gender equality, at least at the level of ideas. 
Given the difficulty of identifying the direction of the flow of ideas, it is 
necessary to have some indirect criteria for this purpose. Rokkan provides a 
useful tool through his examination of centrality and peripherality in the 
domain of economics; that is, he defines centrality and peripherality ultimately 
on the basis of indicators of modernization having originated in 
industrialization (see Rokkan & Urwin 1983, 41-60). Modernization is thus 
preceived to be a process that, because of its advantageous effects, tends to 
expand but that nevertheless endows the Initiator countries with leading 
position (cf. Eisenstadt 1973). The scheme is simple: highly modernized 
countries are classified in the category of centre, less modernized countries are 
in the periphery. In each case a key factor is obviously the point of time when 
the modernization process started, but we may also assume that the boundary 
between centre and periphery changes as the speed of modernization gives 
successful peripheral cases a chance to move into the centre. However, Rokkan 
stresses the stable nature of centrality and peripherality. 
This is the perspective we will be adopting in this study: the final criterion 
for centrality and peripherality is provided by the level of modernization in the 
domains of gender equality and the family. The next step is to determine the 
criterion for the modernization of these two domains. In all Western countries
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both of them have been changing more or less in the same direction for a long 
time, and many sociologists have described these tendencies as part of the 
modernization process (see e.g. Jallinoja 1989a). Gender equality has as such 
been widely regarded as a sign of modernization, involving various compo-
nents that signify the disappearance of status differences between women and 
men (see e.g. Klein 1946, 32; Moberg 1962, 3; Auvinen 1968, 113-120). As far 
as the family is concerned, the emergence of different family forms has been 
seen to mark the beginning of the modernization of the family (Macklin 1987, 
317); accordingly the frequency of new family patterns serve as useful 
indicators of centrality and peripherality in this domain. It can be suggested 
then that the higher the level of gender equality in a country and the more 
frequent the occurrence of non-traditional family patterns, the more apparently 
this country occupies a central position in these respects. For the time being we 
shall omit the question of how far the changes in peripheral countries are due to 
the flow of ideas from central countries; suffice it to assume that the centrality 
vs. peripherality of a position is dependent an the early start of gender equality 
and new family forms. 
The analysis that follows looks at the same Western European countries that 
Rokkan examined, and it employs the classification proposed by Rokkan 
between central and peripheral countries (Rokkan & Urwin 1983, 43). To make 
it easier for the reader to follow the comparisons, the central countries: 
Germany, France, Britain, Switzerland, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Italy and Denmark, are indicated in the Tables (and in some places in 
the text) in boldface. The peripheral countries of Western Europe are Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Norway, Sweden and Finland. The main question that 
we set out to answer is: How far does the territorial division based an the 
economic domain coincide with the centre/periphery division in the domains of 
gender equality and the family, which have been affected by modernization 
much later than the economic sphere? 
Centrality and peripherality in gender equality 
We start by briefly looking at the years when the women's movement began to 
grow up in selected Western European countries and when it played a central 
role in initiating gender equality issues. This sort of classification provides an 
historical perspective which is analogical to the one employed by Rokkan in his 
own analysis: the argument is that centrality develops over a long period of 
time and is therefore dependent on an early start. 
Women's liberation organizations in Western Europe were founded in three 
waves: the First came in 1865-71 (Germany, France, Austria, Britain and 
Denmark), followed by a second wave in 1884-89 (Finland, Sweden, Norway 
and the Netherlands) and finally by a third around the turn of the century in
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1898-1907 (Italy and Belgium) (Jallinoja 1983, 28). As we can see, the 
countries where the women's movement got off to an early start, are the same 
that according to Rokkan occupy a central position in Europe. In these cases 
early modernization and centrality in the domain of economics has gone hand 
in hand with early modernization in the domain of gender equality, at least at 
the level of ideas. There are, however, some exceptions which may anticipate 
further irregularities in centrality and peripherality. For example, Italy and 
Belgium fall under opposite poles in the domains of economics (centre) and the 
women's movement (periphery). The second group of nations is an interesting 
case: although the women's movement started to make an organized presence 
in the Northern periphery some 20 years later than in Central Europe, it was in 
the Nordic countries where gender equality was to move an to achieve the most 
remarkable results. 
Another important landmark in women's emancipation was female suffrage. 
Here, too, there is much variation between different European countries. With 
the notable exception of France, the countries in the ferst or second wave of the 
women's movement saw the introduction of universal suffrage around the First 
World War (sec Table 1); in other words, an early start correlates fairly well 
with the early introduction of suffrage. To sec how far this propitious historical 
background influences gender equality at later times, we now divide our 
countries into two categories: a centre consisting of these countries where 
female suffrage was instituted around the First World War (mainly just after 
the war), and a periphery consisting of these countries where it was introduced 
much later. In our descriptions of contemporary gender equality the focus is on 
three indicators only; this is to ensure that the analysis covers a sufficient 
number of Western European countries. Although this acts to simplify our 
analysis somewhat, it is fair to say that it provides a reasonably solid basis for 
interpretations of the relationship between the politico- economic domain and 
gender equality on the centre/periphery dimension. 
As we can sec an early female suffrage has not necessarily entailed high 
scores in gender equality at later times, but the Nordic countries are well 
compatible with our hypothesis. We can also note that gender equality has not 
advanced evenly an all fronts; in fact quite the opposite is true: in some spheres 
(such as university education) women have made impressive headway, in 
others (such as politics) progress has been slower. Widespread gender equality 
in one sector serves to reduce differences between individual nations as is 
clearly demonstrated in Table 1 by the case of university education. Similarly, 
a high level of gender equality in this sector may distort an otherwise fully 
coherent model. This is seen particularly in the cases of Spain, and Greece, 
where there is full equality between men and women in enrolment into 
universities but where other indicators manifest much less gender equality. The 
uneven development in different sectors of gender equality obviously 
undermines the relevance of the centre/periphery distinction but, on the other
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Table l: 
Gender equality as measured by selected indicators in Western European 
countries, around 1987. 
Country 
Women at 
uni- 
versi- 
ties1 
Employed 
women 
aged 
30-342 
Female
MPs3 
Sum 
indica 
tors4 
Centre     
Finland5 (1906) 100 87 63 250 
Norway (1913) 100 79 69 248 
Denmark (1915) 94 89 58 241
Britain (1918) 84 63 13 160 
Austria (1918) 88 62 23 173 
Ireland (1918) 98 40 17 155 
Germany (1919) 76 62 31 169 
Netherlands (1919) 80 54 40 174 
Luxembourg (1919) 60 54 28 142 
Sweden (1921) 1006 90 57 247 
Periphery     
Portugal 100 74 15 189 
Spain (1931) 100 49 13 162
France (1944) 100 72 13 185 
Belgium (1944) 84 63 14 162 
Italy (1945) 96 60 26 182 
Greece (1952) 100 51 9 160 
Switzerland (1972) 76 49 28 153 
                                                          
1  Source: Statistical Yearbook 1991. Unesco 1991, 3-272-277. Indicators Show the 
percentages of female students of male students at universities and comparable 
institutions around 1988; the value 100 indicates full gender equality or 
overrepresentation of females. 
2  Source: Höpflinger 1990, 26-27. Indicators show the percentage of employed women in 
the age group 30-34 in 1987. 
3  Source: The World's Women 1970-1990. Trends and Statistics. United Nations 1991, 39. 
Percentage of female MPs of male MPs, in 1987; the value 100 indicates full gender 
equality. 
4  The sum indicator is the sum of three indicators demonstrating "overall" gender equality. 
5  Source: The World's Women 1970-1990. Trends and Statistics. United Nations 1991, 39. 
6  Statistisk årsbok 1991, 366-367. 
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hand, differences between countries are this much distinguished and consistent 
that we may regard centre/periphery distinction as justifiable. 
The variation of gender equality in different sectors is to be seen as a 
manifestation of the process through which gender equality tends to move on. 
Political rights (e.g. female suffrage) seem to initiate the process, followed by 
educational equality and then by equality in employment rates. The final and 
most difficult stage in this process is gender equality in higher societal 
positions. Indicators seen in Table 1 serve as evidence of this sort of phased 
process: The scores are systematically highest in the domain of education, next 
highest in employment and lowest in power positions. Despite this general rule, 
gender equality has, in some countries, advanced even in the two last 
mentioned sectors to that extent that differences between nations have evolved 
great. The difference between the lowest and highest scores in female wage 
employment (50) and in the domain of politics (60) really warrants a distinction 
between nations central and peripheral. High scores in the domain of education 
most probably anticipate future changes in other areas of gender equality as 
well, for the research evidence indicates that highly educated women take a 
more active part in working life and in general are more strongly in favour of 
gender equality than less educated women (sec c.g. Mikrozensus Jahres-
ergebnisse 1990, 66; Jallinoja 1989b, 49). 
The final classification into centre and periphery is made an the basis of a 
sum indicator, which suggests a distinction of West European countries into 
three categories. The first of three clearly stands out from the others and is 
considered to represent the centre (sum scores around 250). The rest of the 
countries do not differ from each other very much, but nevertheless a 
distinction can be made between two categories, i.e. intermediate countries 
(sum scores 189-169) and peripheral countries (sum scores 162-142). 
The classification in Table 2 suggests an almost complete reversal of the 
politico-economic distinction between centrality and peripherality when we 
move into the domain of gender equality. The four Nordic countries form a 
more or less coherent territory where equality is highly advanced in several 
gender issues; in this respect they are well ahead of both the continental centre 
and the seaward peripheries as outlined by Rokkan. Centrality in the politico-
economic domain thus seems to afford only a fairly moderate level of gender 
equality in spite of the early start of the women's movement in many of three 
countries. It can thus be concluded that gender equality is relatively inde-
pendent of the country's politico-economic position; or possibly that they are 
inversely related, as countries that have prospered wich the early start of 
modernization have been able to uphold and reinforce the housewife ideology 
that was so typical of the early stage of industrialization (sec e.g. Houghton 
1957; Kraditor 1965; Shorter 1977, 224-231). This, however, only explains the 
situation in some continental countries; it is not a valid factor in the case of 
such late-industrialized seaward countries as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
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Table 2: 
Western European countries divided into three groups with regard to gender 
equality an the basis of the indicators presented in Table 1. 
 
Centre Intermediate Periphery 
Finland Portugal Belgium 
Norway Italy Britain 
Denmark France Spain 
Sweden Netherlands Switzerland 
 Austria Greece 
 Germany Ireland 
  Luxembourg 
 
Greece, where the relatively strong housewife culture is explained by religion. 
It is also reasonable to assume that the strong role of the state - manifested in 
public services for employed women and their children - explains at least part 
of the differences in gender equality. For example, all the Nordic countries 
have in place a comprehensive public day care system which allows women to 
get a job an the labour market (Social Security in the Nordic Countries 1993, 
71). 
Finally, to try to see how far peripherality in gender equality has created a 
spirit of opposition to tendencies visible in the centre, we shall look at three 
indicators that measure attitudes towards gender equality. One of these 
indicators identifies a general attitude (women should have more freedom to do 
what they want to do), while the other two concern the same topics as were 
discussed above, namely women's wage employment and female MPs. As in 
Table 1, we have a sum indicator here to provide a general measure of the 
mental climate with regard to gender equality. Comparing the percentages in 
the second and third columns with the figures shown in Table 1, we may 
observe that the proportions of those favouring gender equality in the 
apportionment of responsibilities in employment and household chores 
between the spouses tend to be higher than the employment rates among 
women aged 30-34, i.e. the age at which women are most likely to be at home 
looking after their children, particularly in those countries where female 
employment rates are relatively low (Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg,  
Spain and Greece). However, even these differences are not as  
conspicuous as those between attitudes towards female MPs  
and the actual percentages of female MPs. This is an interesting  
discovery: at the level of attitudes people appear to have equal  
confidence in female and male MPs, but this is not yet reflected in their voting 
behaviour. In some countries (e.g. France and Britain) the difference is largely 
explained by the electoral system, for one-delegate constituencies do not favour 
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Table 3: 
Proportions of those wanting more freedom for women to do what they want to 
do, of those preferring full or almost full gender equality in employment 
responsibilities and in the apportionment of household chores between spouses, 
and of those seeing female MPs equal to male MPs, as% in 1987 and 1990. 
 
More 
freedom 
for women1 
(1990) 
Equality in 
employment 
and 
housework2 
(1987) 
Female 
MPs 
equal to 
male 
MPs3 
(1987) 
Sum indi 
cators 
Country     
Centre     
Denmark∗ 58 78 86 222 
Intermediate     
Portugal 38 67 63 168
Italy 48 72 59 179
France 51 74 68 193
Netherlands 59 70 79 208
Germany 69 63 65 197
Periphery     
Belgium 47 64 67 178 
Britain 79 80 75 234
Spain 57 65 67 189 
Greece 52 72 58 182
Ireland 78 54 61 193
Luxembourg 49 50 62 161 
                                                          
∗  No data are available on non-EC members: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria and 
Switzerland. 
1  Source: Eurodata 1990, 26. The Proportion of those who agreed with the Statement 
"Women should have more freedom to do what they want to do". 
2  Source: Gabriel 1992, 571. The proportion of those who agree with the statements "In a 
family in which both spouses are equally responsible for employment, equality in the 
apportionment of household chores and child care between spouses should prevail" and "In 
a family in which wife's job is less demanding than husband's job, wife should take more 
responsibility for household chores and child care than husband". 
3  Source: Gabriel 1992, 559. The proportion of those who responded that "They have 
equal confidence in male and female MPs". 
 
women. Nevertheless, it is clear from people's attitudes that peripherality in 
gender equality does not create opposition against tendencies carried into effect 
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in the centre; an the contrary, in the vast majority of peripheral countries people 
are willing to move an towards the model applied in the centre. 
Centrality and peripherality in the family domain 
Ever since the 1960s sociological debates have been showing signs of a 
reorientation to the family. This has led to a revised perception of what is to be 
seen as representing traditional and modern family forms. In the 1950s, Talcott 
Parsons and many of his contemporaries defined the modern family as a unit 
consisting of father, mother and their children; this had become the dominant 
family form in industrialized society. Although this interpretation was later 
criticized by Peter Laslett, for instance, who an the Basis of empirical evidence 
proved that the nuclear family had been a prevalent family pattern in Europe 
for centuries (Laslett 1972), it remained a commonplace notion that the 
intimate nuclear family is a modern phenomenon. Edward Shorter was one of 
the many writers who adhered to this interpretation in the mid-1970s (Shorter 
1977), but theie were also sociologists who were ready to suggest a new view 
on the modern family. 
Eleanor Macklin defines the traditional family pattern as a "legal, lifelong, 
sexually exclusive marriage between one man and one woman, with children, 
where the male is primary provider and ultimate authority" (Macklin 1987, 
317). This was exactly the same as the definition of the 1950s; so what was 
modern in those days had now become traditional. The change was due to the 
emergence of new family forms which were interpreted by many sociologists 
and commentators as omens of a new era. This was reason enough for the 
terminological shift: what was now new was to be perceived as modern or 
nontraditional, and what was no longer new was to become traditional. The lot 
of the nuclear family was to stand alone an one side of the line of demarcation; 
an the other side were nontraditional or alternative family forms, defined by 
Macklin as never-married singlehood, cohabitation, voluntary childlessness, 
single-parenthood, binuclear families, stepfamilies, divorce, remarriage, 
extramarital relationships, same-sex intimate relationships and multiadult 
households (Macklin 1987, 318). 
Sociologists began to show a growing interest in these alternatives, focusing 
on the experiences that people had had in these new family forms (Jallinoja 
1994, 17-19). However, the non-traditional family was soon renamed as the 
postmodern era provided a convenient frame of reference. Shorter was among 
the First writers to refer to the postmodern family, describing it as "the free-
floating couple" (Shorter 1977, 263-272), but it was not until the early 1990s 
that we saw more elaborated discussions of the postmodern family. Its 
characterizations suggest that the postmodern family actually resembles the 
family patterns that some time ago were called non-traditional or modern; the 
only difference is that the postmodern family is described more as an amoebic 
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social unit stemming from perpetual changes in its boundaries and structures 
(sec Stacey 1991). 
The frequencies of alternatives to the traditional family (the nuclear family) 
serve as criteria for the modernization of the family domain and consequently, 
also as criteria for centrality and peripherality. Lacking statistical data an many 
alternative family forms and lifestyles (multiadult households, same-sex 
couples and voluntary childlessness, which according to the data available 
range from almost zero to a couple per cent; sec e.g. Sussman & Steinmetz 
1986; Campbell 1985) we have to concentrate an just a few indicators, which 
nevertheless are sufficient to bring out the main differences between the 
countries concerned. These indicators are divorce rates, the proportion of 
never-married women in age groups 25-29 and 45-49, and the proportion of 
extra-marital live births. The countries have been grouped into three categories 
according to the ranking position each country gained in respect of gender 
equality (sec Table 2). 
The proportion of never-married females in the age group 45-49 shows that 
marriage is by no means an outdated institution; the same conclusion is 
suggested by the figures for women aged 30-34, where the percentage of these 
who have never married ranges from a low 14% (Spain) to 40% (Sweden) 
(Demographic Yearbook 1990, 918-939). The relatively high frequencies of 
single women in the age group 25-29 are an indication of delayed marriages 
and (in many countries) of cohabitation rather than singlehood. Cohabitation is 
now very common among young people in Sweden and Denmark: the figures 
are 48 (1985) and 44% (198088), respectively, among females aged 25-29 
years (Rallu & Blum 1991, 436, 124). In other countries for which the relevant 
data are available, cohabitation is not as popular; in France, for example, 19% 
of all couples in the age group 25-29 who lived together in 1986 were not 
officially married (Rallu & Blum 1991, 30), and in 1990 the figure among 
Austrian men in the saure age group was 7% (Rallu & Blum 1991, 213). 
Norway and Finland lie in-between these extremes: in 1988 the proportion of 
cohabitants among all 27 year-old women living in a union in Norway was 
31% (Rallu & Blum 1991, 142), and in Finland in 1989, the figure for women 
aged 27-31 years was 21% (Väestö 1991:1, 31). All these figures show that the 
frequencies of cohabitation are consistent with other indicators of the degree 
modernization in the family domain. 
The number of live births outside marriage provides evidence of  
more or less the same thing as the proportions of never-marrieds  
in the age group 25-29, but adds one further aspect to the moder- 
nization of the family. High frequencies of such births are not an indica- 
tion of a growing number of single mothers, but rather  
of the increasing popularity of cohabitation even in situations where
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Table 4. 
Proportions of never-married females aged 25-29 and 45-49, and of live births 
out of wedlock as %, and divorce rates around 1989. 
 
Country  
 
Never-married 
females aged 
25-29   45-491
Live births 
out of 
wedlock2
Divorce 
rates3 
Sum 
indi-
cators Centre      
Finland  44 10 25 13 92 
Norway  43 5 34 11 93 
Denmark 54 5 46 13 118 
Sweden  64 9 52 11 136 
Intermediate     
Portugal 17 8 15 4 44 
Italy .. .. 6 2 .. 
France 38 7 30 8 83 
Netherlands 40 5 11 8 64 
Austria 44 .. 24 9 .. 
Germany 37 6 10 8 61 
Periphery      
Belgium 27 .. 9 9 .. 
Britain 35 5 28 12 54 
Spain 30 8 9 2 49 
Switzerland 42 9 6 8 65 
Greece .. .. 2 .. .. 
Ireland 36 9 14 - 59 
Luxembourg 36 7 13 19 66 
      
      
                                                          
1  Source: Demographic Yearbook 1990, 918-938 except for Finland Suomen tilastollinen 
vuosikirja 1991; for Portugal Estatisticas Demogräficas 1988, 33; for Austria Mikro-
zensus Jahresergebnisse 1990, 118 and Demographisches Jahrbuch Österreichs 1990, 56 
(the proportion of divorced and widowed people has been estimated by using the corres-
ponding figures from Finland, which in other respects resembles Austria); for Belgium 
Statistiques Demographiques 1990, 134. 
2  Demographic Statistics 1992, Eurostat, 1992, 82, except for Finland Suomen tilastollinen 
vuosikirja 1991; for Norway, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland European Population, Vol. 
1. 1991. 
3  For Finland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1992, 67; for 
ltaly, France, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg, Demographic 
Statistics 1992, Eurostat, 1992, 123; for Portugal, Estatisticas Demogräficas 1988, 33; for 
Austria, Demographisches Jahrbuch Österreichs 1990, 57 and Mikrozensus Jahresergeb-
nisse 1990, 137; for Spain, Demographic Yearbook 1990, 748-749, 914-939. Divorce rates 
as ratio of annual divorces per 1000 married couples or married women. 
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couples have a child. This is now the case in Sweden and Denmark, but it is 
also relatively common in Finland, where only 6 per cent of all live births are 
actually for single mothers (Väestö 1992:1, 67). This figure is similar to Italy's, 
for example (6% live births are out of wedlock), where cohabitation is not yet 
as institutionalized as it is in the Nordic countries (Rallu & Blom 1991, 368). In 
other words, single motherhood is as yet not a very popular alternative family 
pattern, even though it may be somewhat more common than before. At least it 
has attracted quite considerable public attention both in the mass media and in 
sociological inquiry. 
Divorce rates vary to a lesser extent than the other two indicators in Table 4. 
Unlike the other two indicators, the dissolution of marriage implies, in itself, an 
alternative family pattern; first, one-parent families (if the couple has children) 
and second, stepfamilies as a result of remarriages. The proportion of one-
parent families was in 1982 highest in Sweden at around 26%, but generally the 
figure is in the region of 10 per cent or less (Höpflinger 1990, 35). Stepfamilies 
are less frequent than one-parent families; in Finland, for example, the 
proportion of stepfamilies of all families with children under 18 years in 1986 
was 7% (Elinolot 1989:1, 121), in Germany 7.5 per cent (1982) and in Britain 
about 5 per cent (1982) (Höpflinger 1990, 35). 
Table 5: 
Western European countries divided into core centre, centre, intermediate and 
periphery in the family domain according to the sum indicators of Table 4. 
Core centre  Centre Intermediate  Periphery 
Sweden  Norway Netherlands Ireland 
Denmark Finland Luxembourg Spain 
 Austria Switzerland Belgium
 France Germany Portugal 
 Britain  Italy 
As to the attitudes towards the family, we have to rely an not so up-to-date 
data. According to surveys conducted in 1981, Western Europeans quite 
unanimously regarded highly the traditional type of family and marriage. The 
proportions of those who were of the opinion that marriage is an outdated 
institution varied between 12 (Ireland) and 29 percent (France), while the 
proportions of those who agreed with the statement "A child needs a home with 
both a father and a mother to grow up happily" varied from 55 (Denmark) to 90 
percent (Italy). Additionally, the majority of Western Europeans regarded 
faithfulness as very important for a successful marriage; the percentages ranged 
from 72 (France) to 89 (Ireland). (Harding et al. 1986, 120-121.) All
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these figures indicate that the prevailing attitudes do not favour the 
modernization of the family as in the Gase of gender equality; there attitudes 
are much more in favour of modernization. This may also mean that 
peripherality in the family domain does not breed such an aspiration for central 
position as in the case of gender equality. 
If we then move on to look at how centrality in the economic domain 
implies centrality in the family domain (sec Table 5), we can note that they are 
not consistent with each other. In the same way as in the case of gender 
equality, centrality in the domain of economics typically implies an 
intermediate position; the necessary exceptions to this rule are Belgium and 
Italy. Peripherality in the economic domain, then, divides our countries into 
two opposite groups, as was the case in gender equality: one of them forms part 
of the centre (the Nordic countries), the other the majority of the periphery 
(seaward countries). 
Conclusions 
One of the main results of this study is that politico-economic centrality and 
peripherality do not coincide with centrality and peripherality in the domains of 
gender equality and the family. This would appear to be at variance with the 
prevailing view that the modernization of gender relationships and the family is 
essentially bound up with societal modernization. In the long run and in general 
this has indeed been true and therefore we can regard all of them as parallel 
tendencies (sec e.g. Jallinoja 1989a), but upon closer inspection we find clear 
evidence of incongruous trends. 
Without going into details and exceptions we can draw some general 
conclusions about the relationship of the economic domain to gender equality 
and the family domain. Peripherality in gender equality and the family domain 
seems furthermore to be connected with peripherality in the economic domain, 
but it is obviously caused by strong religiousness as well. In fact, this may be 
the factor that explains the differences between nations more than the level of 
societal modernization whose influence seems to be more indirect. The predo-
minant denomination is Catholic in those countries where the gender relations 
and the family are less modernized, whereas Protestantism prevails in those 
countries where these two domains are most modernized. Catholism and 
Protestantism thus serve as a fairly clear line of demarcation, but in many parts 
of Central Europe the influence of Catholism is weakened by a high level of 
societal modernization. It also seems to be the fact that Catholism as such is not 
sufficient to promote peripherality in the family and gender equality, instead it 
is religiousness of ordinary people that counts for this. For example, France is a 
Catholic country but in spite of this it does not belong to the periphery in the 
domains of the family and gender issues. Low church attendance rate (17
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percent attended church once a month or more often in 1982) compared to high 
church attendance rate in Ireland (88 percent) create quite different moral 
atmospheres in these countries, the first one favouring gender equality and the 
modernization of the family more than the latter one (sec Inglehart 1990, 51, 
190). The significance of the religion and religiousness is based an the 
dominant role the Church has had in defining moral norms concerning be-
haviors in family and gender matters; in this respect, the role of the Catholic 
Church has remained as before more obviously than in the case of the 
Protestant Churches. Because the norms and values of the Church has been 
traditional (or they have been labelled as traditional), it is quite natural that 
those who are religious tend to be inclined to traditional values and behaviours. 
In our scheme this means peripherality. 
The sociological discussion on the relationship of the family and gender 
equality has stressed their positive correlation. The connection of these two 
domains has come out in the anti-feminist and familistic sociological literature 
that speaks against the modernization of the gender relationship and the family 
(sec e.g. Lasch 1982; Berger and Berger 1984) as well as in the feminist 
literature that is inclined to favour gender equality and alternative family 
patterns. Although the long-term trends in these domains have also been in the 
same direction and given ground to talk about parallel processes, there are 
certain irregularities which justify the conclusion that these domains are also 
relatively independent of each other. To compare the countries of Western 
Europe in this respect, we have crosstabulated gender equality and the family 
with regard to the position occupied by each country an the dimension of 
centrality and peripherality by using the classifications presented in Tables 2 
and 5. 
Ten out of the seventeen countries (59°Io) occupy a "logical" place, which is 
consistent with the argument that gender equality correlates positively wich the 
modernization of the family, or at least that they tend to change simultaneously. 
The rest of the countries can be divided into two groups; the larger group 
consists of those countries where the modernization of the family is more 
pronounced than gender equality (Austria, France, Britain, Switzerland and 
Luxembourg), while the other group consists of those countries where the 
situation is the opposite (Portugal and Italy). According to these results it 
would seem that the family is the domain where modernization is more 
apparent than in the gender relationship, or perhaps more correctly, irrespective 
of how far gender equality has advanced. 
The comparison presented in Figure 1 is based an our classification of the 
countries of Western Europe into centre, intermediate and periphery without 
taking into account the distance to the extreme poles in both domains. This 
means that centrality in the domain of gender equality may be "more central" 
than centrality in the domain of the family or vice versa. If we take into account 
the degree of modernization by giving 100 points to the highest scores of the
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Figure 1. Location of Western European countries in centre, 
intermediate and periphery in the domain of gender equality 
and the family. 
 
THE FAMILY 
GENDER 
EQUALITY 
Core centre 
or Centre 
Intermediate Periphery 
Centre Sweden 
Denmark 
Norway 
Finland 
  
Intermediate Austria 
France 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Portugal 
Spain 
Periphery Britain Luxembourg 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
Spain 
Greece 
Ireland 
 
sum indicators in each domain (Finland in the case of gender equality and 
Sweden in the domain of the family), the results will look different. As we can 
sec in Table 6, the relative difference between the countries with regard to the 
degree of modernization is greater in the domain of the family than in the case 
of gender equality. Second, we can sec that the modernization of the gender 
relationship has advanced further than in the domain of the family; in some 
cases the relative difference in this respect is quite remarkable (Portugal, Italy 
and Greecc). Other countries belonging to this group are Finland, Norway, 
Belgium, Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, France and 
Luxembourg. In the rest of the countries (Austria, Denmark, Britain and 
Sweden) the modernization of gender equality and the family has advanced at 
more or less the same rate. There is no country where the modernization of the 
family goes ahead of gender equality. These results open up an additional 
perspective on the relationship between gender equality and the family. If we 
look at the relative distance of each country from the top position in both 
domains, then gender equality tends to advance more apparently than (and to a 
certain extent irrespective of) the degree of modernization of the family, mostly 
because of the late start of the latter process, but also because the majority of
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people oppose the far-going modernization of the family. As was seen above, 
most Western Europeans still very much appreciate the nuclear family and 
marriage. 
Table 6. 
Relative position of Western European countries with regard to the 
modernization of gender equality and the family.* 
Country 
Difference Gender equality Family
Finland 100 65 35 
Norway 99 69 30 
Sweden 99 100 -1 
Denmark 96 89 7 
Portugal 76 28 48 
France 74 59 15 
Italy 73 (28) (45) 
Netherlands 70 46 24 Austria 69 61 8 
Germany 68 43 25 
Spain 65 35 30 
Belgium 65 35 30 
Britain 64 59 5 
Greece 64 (24) (40) 
Ireland 62 (40) (22) 
Switzerland 61 44 17 
Luxembourg 57 46 11 
Difference as % points 43 76 
* The relative position has been calculated on the 
basis of the sum indicators shown in Tables 1 and 4 
and by giving the value 100 to the highest scores. 
As to the territorial aspect in the domains of gender equality and the family, 
we have to conclude that it is not as apparent as in the politico-economic 
domain where Central Europe constitutes the core area. Additionally, it needs 
to be stressed that gender equality and the family have to be examined 
separately in this respect owing to their relative independence. As Figure 2 
demonstrates, there are only a few Gases where Western European countries 
constitute clearly visible cultural territories consisting of several neighbouring 
countries. One such territory is represented by the Nordic countries, which all 
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have a high level of gender equality; indeed this region can be legitimately 
described as a unified cultural area. A similar cultural coherence can also be 
seen in the countries that Rokkan classified as seaward periphery: because of 
the slow modernization of the family, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece 
form a culturally homogeneous territory. 
In all other respects it is difficult to trace any homogeneous territories, 
especially wich regard to the family trends. In the case of gender equality, 
Central Europe is fairly coherent, mainly because of its intermediate position 
with the exception of Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Central Europe 
is more split in the domain of the family, which also concerns the Nordic 
countries albeit to a lesser extent. All these results suggest the assumption that 
national cultural heritage is a more important factor than connections between 
neighbouring countries; that heritage creates a relatively unique cultural 
climate in each country. Accordingly, we can suggest that the simple flow of 
codes which defines family trends and gender equality is not a decisive factor 
behind the factual trends in development; rather those trends are construed out 
of cultural climates, irrespective of the flow of codes that has been continuing 
for decades. 
lf we accept the argument that the flow of codes in the cases of gender 
equality and the family is not a decisive factor, then we have also to conclude 
that the concepts of centrality and peripherality are less relevant than in the 
politico-economic domain, where material affluence and political dominance 
more easily create preconditions for hierarchic relationships. Instead of the 
concepts of centrality and peripherality, there is better justification to use such 
terms as avantgarde or vanguard, an the one hand, and late-comers, an the 
other. Modernization would thus be a continuous process in respect to which 
even the countries of Western Europe differ from each other, with some 
countries acting as forerunners of change and others following at a shorter or 
longer distance. However, there is reason to believe that the flow of codes 
concerning gender equality may assume increasing importance in the future as 
efforts are intensified to strengthen gender equality through the European 
Union for example. This will bring more equality among the European 
societies in this respect and call into question the relevance even of the terms 
forerunner and late-comer. 
Modernization now distinguishes different countries from each other, but 
there are also intra-national distinctions, as we can sec from many of the 
indicators presented above, dividing people in each country into those who are 
inclined to modern conduct and those who are more inclined to make 
traditional choices. As modernization is a universalizing process by nature, 
modern people in all countries resemble each other. The same applies most 
probably to traditionality as well, although its content may vary more than in 
the case of modernity. Cultural peculiarities thus spring from an inclination to 
favour either modernity or traditionality, which in practice is seen in the 
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proportions of modern people. However, more detailed qualitative information 
is needed on the cultural and political conditions that contribute to the 
favourable preconditions for either type of inclination. As mentioned above, 
religion is one important factor that regulates inclination to modernity, but the 
other thing is to explain why the significance of religion varies so much in 
Western European countries. We can also suggest the assumption that 
secularized countries may develop new types of norms and Values that will 
regulate the modernization of the family in their own way. For example, liberal 
divorce laws such as in Finland already include detailed regulations for 
arrangements that aim at guaranteeing the realization of the principle "each 
child shall have a right for both parents" (see Gottberg-Talve 1990). 
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